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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 13-4100 
_____________ 
 
DAVID WAWRZYNSKI, 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
H.J. HEINZ COMPANY; H.J. HEINZ COMPANY, L.P.; HEINZ GP LLC.  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-11-cv-01098 
District Judge: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 7, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  July 21, 2014) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
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David Wawrzynski (“Wawrzynski”), an inventor and business owner 
residing in Michigan, brought this suit for breach of implied contract and unjust 
enrichment against H.J. Heinz Company, H.J. Heinz Company, L.P., and Heinz GP 
LLC (collectively, “Heinz”). The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania ruled that Wawrzynski’s claims were preempted by 
federal patent law and granted summary judgment to Heinz. The District Court 
subsequently also granted summary judgment to Heinz on its counterclaim seeking 
a declaration of non-infringement on a patent owned by Wawrzynski, and entered 
final judgment in favor of Heinz. For the reasons set forth below, we will vacate 
the judgment, reverse the District Court’s rulings on the summary judgment 
motions, and remand to the District Court. 
 In 1997, Wawrzynski was issued Patent No. 5,676,990 for a “Method of 
Food Article Dipping and Wiping in a Condiment Container” (the “‘990 Patent”). 
See Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 299a–303a. The ‘990 Patent involves a process for 
dipping and wiping a food article in a specially designed condiment container. The 
summary of the ‘990 Patent describes a condiment container composed of a body, 
a flexible cap, and a tear-away strip attached to the cap. J.A. 299a. When the tear-
away strip is removed, a slit is formed in the cap, allowing an article of food to be 
dipped into the condiment. When the consumer removes the food article from the 
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container, the slit edges wipe away excess condiment from the food article, thereby 
reducing the chances that the condiment will drip or spill. Id. 
 Based on ideas contained in the ‘990 Patent, Wawrzynski developed and 
marketed an idea for a new condiment packet, which he dubbed the “Little 
Dipper.” Wawrzynski describes the Little Dipper as “a condiment package into 
which [a consumer] could dip a food article and the top of the container would 
wipe off any excess condiment back into the container.” First Am. Compl. ¶ 33, 
J.A. 136. Significantly, although Wawrzynski acknowledges that the Little Dipper 
“evolved” from the process embodied in the ‘990 Patent, the method protected by 
the ‘990 Patent is “separate and distinct” from the Little Dipper. Appellant’s Br. 6. 
 In March 2008, Wawrzynski sent correspondence and promotional materials 
to several individuals at Heinz in an effort to market the Little Dipper. See First 
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34–36, J.A. 136a–137a; see also J.A. 263a–269a. Wawrzynski met 
with Heinz representatives in April 2008. According to Wawrzynski, during this 
meeting he presented to Heinz his idea for a dual-function condiment container 
that would allow the consumer to either dip food into the condiment or squeeze out 
the condiment. Appellant’s Br. 2, 6. Wawrzynski also claims that during this 
meeting he presented Heinz with graphic designs of the Little Dipper, suggested 
that the new dual-function condiment container should have a “catchy name,” and 
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discussed his ideas for a promotional campaign to publicize the new condiment 
container. Appellant’s Br. 6.  
Wawrzynski asserts that the ideas he presented at this meeting were a major 
breakthrough for Heinz. He alleges that Heinz had been trying—without success—
to develop a new ketchup packet for approximately four years prior to this 
meeting. Wawrzynski claims that, after his meeting with the company’s 
representatives, Heinz was able to successfully develop a new ketchup packet 
(called the “Dip & Squeeze”) using his packaging and marketing ideas. First Am. 
Compl. ¶ 47, J.A. 138a. However, Wawrzynski alleges that, although Heinz 
understood that it would have to pay him if it used his ideas, Heinz failed to 
compensate him. Id. ¶¶ 48–49, J.A. 138a–139a. 
  Wawrzynski filed suit against Heinz in Michigan state court, alleging 
claims of (1) breach of implied contract and (2) unjust enrichment, based on 
Heinz’s failure to compensate him for using his ideas and marketing strategies in 
developing and promoting the Dip & Squeeze. Heinz removed the case to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Eastern 
District of Michigan subsequently granted Heinz’s motion to transfer venue to the 
Western District of Pennsylvania.  
In September 2011, Heinz brought two counterclaims against Wawrzynski, 
seeking declaratory relief that (1) the Dip & Squeeze did not infringe on the ‘990 
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Patent, and (2) the ‘990 Patent was invalid and unenforceable. In his answer to 
Heinz’s counterclaims, Wawrzynski emphasized that he “does not assert that Heinz 
infringes on the ‘990 Patent.” J.A. 345-1. Wawrzynski also submitted, as an 
attachment to his answer to the counterclaims, an executed Covenant Not to Sue in 
which he “unconditionally and irrevocably covenant[ed] to refrain from making 
any claim or demand, or from commencing, causing, or permitting to be 
prosecuted any action in law or equity, against Heinz . . . on account of a cause of 
action for infringing the ‘990 Patent based on any of Heinz’ current and/or 
previous product designs . . . .” J.A. 347a.  
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Heinz on both 
Wawrzynski’s claims and on Heinz’s counterclaim for non-infringement. First, on 
May 16, 2012, the District Court granted Heinz’s motion for summary judgment as 
to Wawrzynski’s claims for breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment, 
concluding that these claims conflicted with federal patent law and thus were 
preempted. Subsequently, on June 20, 2012, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Heinz as to its first counterclaim, awarding a declaratory 
judgment that Heinz had not infringed on the ‘990 Patent, and permitted Heinz to 
withdraw its second counterclaim. The District Court then entered final judgment 
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in favor of Heinz on June 20, 2012, and closed the case. This timely appeal 
followed.1 
Upon reviewing the record before us, we conclude that the District Court 
erred in concluding that Wawrzynski’s claims are preempted by patent law. We 
also conclude that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor 
of Heinz as to the counterclaim for a declaration of non-infringement.  
First, the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of 
Heinz as to Wawrzynski’s claims for breach of implied contract and unjust 
enrichment. The basis for the District Court’s ruling was its erroneous conclusion 
that these state law claims conflict with federal patent law and thus are preempted. 
Federal patent law preempts state law claims to the extent that state law “stands as 
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress” in enacting the patent laws. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil 
Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If a 
state law claim seeks “patent-like protection to intellectual property inconsistent 
with the federal scheme,” the state law claim is preempted. Dow Chem. Co. v. 
Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998). We disagree with the District 
                                                 
1  Wawrzynski initially appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit. On September 6, 2013, the Federal Circuit concluded that it did not have 
jurisdiction over this appeal and transferred the case to us, pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. Dee v. Borough of Dunmore, 549 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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Court’s determination that Wawrzynski “is seeking patent-like remedies for his 
state law claims” and its conclusion that Wawrzynski’s state law claims conflict 
with federal patent law. J.A. 42a. Wawrzynski brought his suit in Michigan state 
court, alleging quasi-contract claims for breach of implied contract and unjust 
enrichment against Heinz. Wawrzynski’s complaint does not seek to recover for 
patent infringement; rather, the complaint requests “[d]amages . . . arising from 
Defendants’ failure to pay Mr. Wawrzynski for his concepts and ideas regarding 
new condiment packaging and marketing for new condiment packaging,” including 
“incidental damages, consequential damages, lost profits and exemplary damages.” 
J.A. 140a. Because Wawrzynski seeks to recover for the benefit that he allegedly 
conveyed on Heinz regarding his ideas for the design and marketing of a new 
condiment container—a benefit beyond the ideas embodied in the ‘990 Patent—
and because his claims are not inconsistent with the federal patent scheme, 
Wawrzynski’s claims are not preempted by patent law. Thus, we will reverse the 
order of the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of Heinz on the 
basis of patent preemption. 
 We also conclude that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Heinz as to its counterclaim seeking a declaration of non-
infringement on the ‘990 Patent. Based on its prior holding that Wawrzynski’s 
claims were preempted by patent law, and reasoning that there existed “conflicting 
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evidence” on whether Wawrzynski’s claims alleged patent infringement, J.A. 54a, 
the District Court determined that there existed a viable case or controversy on the 
issue of patent infringement. As indicated above, however, this premise was 
flawed. Wawrzynski’s complaint does not allege claims for patent infringement. 
Any lingering doubt on that issue was eliminated when Wawrzynski executed the 
Covenant Not to Sue, in which he unconditionally and irrevocably disclaimed any 
argument or claim that Heinz had infringed on the ‘990 Patent. See J.A. 347a. In 
light of these facts, there is no case or controversy on the issue of patent 
infringement, and thus the District Court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to 
rule on Heinz’s counterclaim seeking a declaration of non-infringement. See Dow 
Jones & Co., Inc. v. Ablaise Ltd., 606 F.3d 1338, 1345–48 (Fed Cir. 2010); see 
also Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726–29 (2013). Accordingly, we 
will reverse the order of the District Court granting summary judgment to Heinz on 
its counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment as to non-infringement and direct 
that the District Court dismiss this counterclaim. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the judgment entered in favor 
of Heinz, reverse the orders of the District Court granting summary judgment to 
Heinz, and remand this matter for further proceedings. 
